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Never has any Arab-owned media venture attracted
so much Western attention as Al-Jazeera Satellite
Channel, broadcaster of 24-hour news and current
affairs from the tiny Gulf emirate of Qatar. Al-Jazeera
was just five years old when it soared to internation-
al prominence in late 2001 through its presence in-
side Afghanistan and access to the videotape of
Usama bin Laden. Yet media coverage of Al-Jazeera
itself, as a newsworthy institution in its own right,
long predated the September atrocities and subse-
quent US air strikes on Afghanistan. Indeed, the very
uniqueness of Al-Jazeera's output in Arabic provides
an insight into the unusual power relations that have
produced such a prolific stream of suicide attackers
from Arab countries.
Testing Time 
for Al-Jazeera
Free, open and constructive dialogue among
people of diverse political persuasions is
rare on Arab television, because govern-
ments impose tight censorship. As most
commentators point out, this censorship is
self-evidently not imposed on Al-Jazeera.
Even those who have never watched the
station have grasped why its programme ti-
tles Ð like 'More than One Opinion', 'The Op-
posite Direction', or 'Without Bounds' Ð are
so significant in a region where television
channels are uniformly treated as organs of
the ruling elite. In most Arab countries it is
the information minister's job to ensure that
state television expresses one opinion, fol-
lows one direction and stays well within
bounds. As for privately owned Lebanese or
Palestinian channels, or most pan-Arab
satellite stations, these remain subject to
legal constraints and political imperatives
that prevent them from giving airtime to a
full range of political views.1 The stormy talk
shows, viewer comments and critiques of
government policy that have become hall-
marks of Al-Jazeera have gripped audiences
across the region because they are unprece-
dented on Arabic-language television.
While reaction to such programming has
been predictably hostile from those with a
vested interest in continued censorship, a
school of thought is finally growing in the
Arab world that draws a link between the
censorious and autocratic nature of local
rule and the rise of extreme and violent
forms of protest. This view, expressed for ex-
ample by Sheikh Nahyan Bin Mubarak, the
UAE minister of higher education, attributes
the extremism of suicide bombers to 'the
way Arab countries are ruled'.2 When the
minister said a 'giant step' was needed to
'change political life in the Arab world', he
seemed to be echoing calls from every quar-
ter for the opening up of political, cultural
and media channels through which griev-
ances can be openly articulated and reme-
dies hammered out, without the process
ending in a jail sentence or other sanctions
for those involved.
Bias or balance?
With conduits for authentic Arab public
opinion in very short supply, Al-Jazeera's
management and staff have had to find
their own way in a lonely part of the institu-
tional landscape. While other television
channels conform to the expectation that
owners will dictate content (on the grounds
that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'),
Al-Jazeera's unusual ownership and funding
formula leave viewers confused about
whether its content is 'balanced' or 'biased'.
Al-Jazeera is not under the thumb of an in-
formation ministry because Qatar no longer
has one. The station was launched with a
five-year loan and set out to become self-fi-
nancing through sales of advertising air-
time, royalties from exclusive film footage
and the leasing out of facilities and equip-
ment in its many bureaux around the world.
Officials angered by what they perceive to
be bias against them consequently have
few levers to pull to influence future cover-
age. There is little to be gained from remon-
strating with the Qatari government, which
disclaims editorial responsibility for Al-
Jazeera. Pressurizing advertisers to stay
away merely reduces one source of Al-
Jazeera income.
Arab ministers have demonstrated their
displeasure over the years by boycotting
the station, closing its offices or withdraw-
ing accreditation from its correspondents.
Measures like these reinforce existing pro-
establishment imbalances, since those in
power already have ample access to the
production side of media outlets under their
control. What they do not have is control
over the reception side, since they cannot
guarantee to command the attention of
viewers. Those who decline to appear on Al-
Jazeera forego an opportunity to put their
points to an audience recently estimated at
35 million. But the price of making points on
Al-Jazeera is a readiness to see them chal-
lenged. The station's managing director,
Mohammed Jassem al-Ali, believes it is Al-
Jazeera's appetite for controversy and
clashing perspectives that 'respects viewers'
intelligence' and makes for 'interesting tele-
v i s i o n ' .3 Unlike the many perennially loss-
making Arab television stations, Al-Jazeera
is obliged to make 'interesting' television
and diversify its income in order to survive.
It has done this in the past by making full
commercial use of facilities in Baghdad, es-
pecially during the US and UK air strikes on
Iraq in 1998, and by providing intensive cov-
erage of the Palestinian uprising that erupt-
ed in September 2000. Given the dominant
US television channels' euphemistic report-
ing on Israel, which glosses over Israeli an-
nexation of Arab East Jerusalem, expansion
of illegal settlements in occupied territory
and assassinations of Palestinian political
f i g u r e s ,4 Al-Jazeera's engagement with the
Palestinian experience of occupation could
be seen as effectively redressing a long-
standing imbalance in international cover-
age of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
'With us or against us'
For Western politicians and journalists
perplexed about the realities of life in the
Arab world, Al-Jazeera has offered a small
and inevitably misty window onto pent-up
anger and alienation. Some observers, how-
ever, especially in the US in the wake of Sep-
tember 11, decided that what Al-Jazeera
staff regard as professional and compelling
programming was not merely unhelpful but
inflammatory. George Bush's stark message
to players on the world stage, that '[y]ou are
either with us or against us', called for Al-
Jazeera's output to be judged on criteria
that had not previously been applied to
supposedly independent news organiza-
tions. In accordance with Mr Bush's polariz-
ing message, Al-Jazeera came under sus-
tained US pressure to show whose side it
was on. On visiting Washington shortly be-
fore the US launched air strikes on
Afghanistan, Qatar's ruler, Sheikh Hamad
Khalifa al-Thani, told reporters that his hosts
had 'advised' him to have the television
channel toned down. Apparently embar-
rassed by the revelation, senior White
House figures took the opportunity to be in-
terviewed on Al-Jazeera. But ill will endured.
Zev Chafets, writing in the New York Daily
N e w s, urged the US military to shut down Al-
Jazeera, saying it had the power to 'poison
the air more efficiently and lethally than an-
thrax ever could'.5 When a US bomb struck
the station's office in Kabul on November
13, Al-Jazeera staff were not alone in deduc-
ing that it had been deliberately hit. If US
policy-makers wanted justification for re-
garding Al-Jazeera as the enemy, Fouad
Ajami regaled them with it five days later, in
a lengthy article in the New York Times. De-
scribing the station as a 'dangerous force'
with a 'virulent anti-American bias', Ajami
warned America's leaders not to waste their
time pressing its backers for more moderate
coverage, and not to give what he termed
the 'satellite channel of Arab radicalism' a
helping hand.6
The problem for Al-Jazeera and its audi-
ence, be they admirers or critics, is that it re-
mains one of a kind. For as long as the
broadcasting of uncensored, free-to-air
news and current affairs in Arabic remain
the exception rather than the rule, it is cer-
tain to arouse strong feelings and surprise.
As an Egyptian veteran of both English-lan-
guage and Arabic-language television once
remarked, Arab audiences react differently
to controversial television programming de-
pending on the identity of the broadcaster
and the language of the broadcast. The nov-
elty of Arab reporters making programmes
according to criteria other than political ex-
pediency has yet to wear off. Social scien-
tists from the region note the same shock
factor in their field. Path-breaking social sci-
ence research in Arab states risks being con-
sidered sensationalist and disloyal if pub-
lished in Arabic, simply because the body of
uncensored, newly released findings that
are accessible to local populations is cur-
rently rather small.
Survey results
Meanwhile, the problems of Al-Jazeera's
singularity are magnified by misconcep-
tions about media effects. These include the
widespread but misplaced conviction that
viewers are highly susceptible to propagan-
da whether or not its content accords with
their lifetime's accumulation of experience,
knowledge and beliefs. Professor Shibley
Telhami of the University of Maryland has
debunked this notion, using statistical evi-
dence from surveys conducted in five Arab
states. Addressing the Middle East Insti-
tute's annual conference in Washington on
October 19, Telhami said the deep personal
preoccupation of so many ordinary Arabs
with the treatment of Palestinians had noth-
ing to do with Al-Jazeera. His surveys
showed that concern for Palestinians was
higher among those who had not watched
Al-Jazeera than those who had. What had
changed in the last two years, he said, was
not Al-Jazeera and the screening of pictures
showing 'too much blood'. Radicalization
did not result from television. What had
changed was the world and, with it, the pos-
sibilities for Middle East peace.7
For as long as misunderstanding about the
shaping of Arab public opinion persists, and
with no channel ready to challenge Al-
Jazeera on its own terms, the aftermath of
September 11 will continue to be a testing
time for uncensored television in the Arab
world. If, as suggested, Al-Jazeera establishes
a presence in Somalia ahead of US action in
that country, its distinctive logo and 'Exclu-
sive' label will once again be seen on West-
ern television screens and the royalty com-
ponent of its revenue base will be further se-
cured. On the other hand, judging from
events in Kabul in November, and notwith-
standing the US military's insistence that a
bona fide news operation would not be seen
as a military target, the physical security of
an Al-Jazeera operation in Mogadishu or
elsewhere may be less assured. 
